Two weeks of American primary elections have produced two compelling political narratives.

The first is that Democratic voters are leading their party toward a socialist revolution. Progressive candidates have defeated better-funded establishment opponents, democratic socialists are becoming competitive beyond the country’s largest cities, and economic populism has emerged as one of the defining forces of the 2026 campaign.

The second is that President Donald Trump may be losing his ability to dictate Republican primaries. Some Trump-backed candidates have won decisively, but others have lost, fallen into runoffs or required the president to quietly retreat from earlier endorsements.

Both narratives contain elements of truth. Neither fully explains what voters actually did.

The results from the August 11 and August 18 contests instead reveal two parties experiencing different forms of internal change. Democratic voters appear increasingly willing to challenge incumbents, wealthy donors and the party establishment—but they are not consistently choosing socialists. Republican voters remain overwhelmingly inside Trump’s political movement, even when they occasionally reject the particular candidate he prefers.

The more accurate conclusion is that Democrats are undergoing an insurgency, not yet a socialist revolution. Trump, meanwhile, has suffered visible cracks in his endorsement record, but there is little evidence that Republican voters are abandoning Trumpism itself.

Progressive victories—but not one coherent revolution

The strongest evidence of a Democratic shift came from Minnesota and Florida.

Minnesota Lieutenant-Governor Peggy Flanagan defeated U.S. Representative Angie Craig for the Democratic Senate nomination on August 11. Craig entered the race with support from prominent party figures and a reputation as a pragmatic Democrat capable of winning competitive suburban territory.

Flanagan ran a more progressive campaign, criticizing the influence of wealthy donors and attacking Craig over her support for a Trump-backed immigration measure. Flanagan, a member of the White Earth Nation, would become the first Native American woman elected to the U.S. Senate if she wins in November.

Her victory followed Abdul El-Sayed’s earlier win in Michigan, where the physician and former Detroit health director defeated establishment-supported rivals for the Democratic Senate nomination. Together, the results suggested that progressive economic arguments could succeed in statewide contests—not only in safe congressional districts in New York, Chicago or Denver.

Florida delivered another significant result on August 18. State Representative Angie Nixon defeated former national-security official Alex Vindman for the Democratic nomination in the special U.S. Senate election. Nixon, a progressive supported by Our Revolution, the organization created by allies of Senator Bernie Sanders, overcame a candidate with substantial national recognition and establishment credibility.

That was a meaningful ideological victory. But calling it evidence of a socialist takeover requires several important qualifications.

Nixon and Flanagan are progressives, but neither victory should automatically be classified as a win for democratic socialism. “Progressive,” “social democratic” and “democratic socialist” are frequently treated as interchangeable labels in American political coverage, even though candidates may differ substantially on public ownership, taxation, labour policy and the proper role of markets.

The distinction matters. A party can move left on health care, housing, labour rights or corporate taxation without embracing socialism as an economic system.

There is also the question of electability. Florida has not elected a Democrat to the U.S. Senate since 2012, and the state has moved sharply toward Republicans during the Trump era. Nixon’s nomination is therefore an important test: can a progressive campaign expand the Democratic electorate, or will Republicans use the socialist label to make an already difficult statewide race even harder?

A primary victory changes a party’s conversation. A general-election victory changes who governs.

Wisconsin provides the clearest counterexample

If the Democratic Party were experiencing a straightforward socialist revolution, Wisconsin should have provided some of the strongest evidence.

State Representative Francesca Hong, an openly democratic socialist, came within approximately 3,000 votes of winning the Democratic nomination for governor. Her campaign showed that a socialist candidate could become a serious statewide contender in one of America’s most closely divided states.

But Hong did not win.

Milwaukee County Executive David Crowley, a more conventional Democrat endorsed by Governor Tony Evers, prevailed by roughly four-tenths of a percentage point. Crowley emphasized governing experience, coalition-building and his potential appeal beyond the party’s ideological base.

The closeness of the result was historically significant. It demonstrated that democratic socialism is no longer confined to a few heavily Democratic urban districts. At the same time, the outcome demonstrated that many Democratic primary voters still consider experience, perceived electability and ideological moderation important.

Crowley will face Trump-endorsed Republican Tom Tiffany in November. Wisconsin voted for Trump in both 2016 and 2024, making the contest one of the most consequential tests of whether Democrats can convert dissatisfaction with the administration into control of a competitive state government.

The Wisconsin result is therefore evidence of socialist growth—but not socialist control.

The same voters did not always move in the same direction

Minnesota offered perhaps the clearest warning against reading every result as part of a single ideological wave.

Democratic voters selected Flanagan, the progressive insurgent, for Senate. On the same night, they nominated Senator Amy Klobuchar for governor. Klobuchar is one of the party’s most recognizable mainstream figures and has built her career around institutional experience and broad electoral appeal.

These were not necessarily contradictory decisions. Voters can prefer a progressive candidate in one race and an establishment candidate in another because they are judging different opponents, offices and political circumstances.

The Connecticut results told a similar story.

Former Hartford mayor Luke Bronin defeated 14-term U.S. Representative John Larson in the Democratic primary. Larson’s defeat was dramatic, but it was primarily a generational and anti-incumbent result rather than a socialist victory. Bronin argued that the district required new energy and urgency; he did not run as a democratic socialist seeking to overturn the party’s economic philosophy.

That distinction may be the key to understanding the Democratic primaries.

The common thread is not necessarily socialism. It is dissatisfaction.

Candidates who could portray themselves as younger, more urgent, less beholden to donors or less attached to Washington’s political routines often performed well. In some races, those candidates were socialists. In others, they were progressives, institutional liberals or pragmatic mayors.

The Associated Press reached a similar conclusion after the August 11 contests: Democratic voters appeared united by a desire for change, but not by agreement over one ideological direction.

Florida’s Democrats chose both a progressive and a centrist

The August 18 Florida results made the Democratic picture even more complicated.

While Nixon won the Senate nomination from the progressive wing, former Republican congressman David Jolly won the Democratic nomination for governor. Jolly, who changed parties in 2025, campaigned as an explicit centrist. He defended capitalism, promoted leaner government and attempted to distance himself from the cultural battles dominating national politics.

His victory over more traditionally liberal opponents is difficult to reconcile with the idea of an across-the-board socialist revolution.

In another Florida race, former Democratic National Committee chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz defeated former congresswoman Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick and other challengers in a redrawn congressional district. Wasserman Schultz is among the clearest surviving symbols of the Democratic establishment—the same establishment that Sanders supporters have criticized for a decade.

Florida Democrats therefore made three different choices on the same ballot:

  • They selected a progressive insurgent for Senate.
  • They selected a former Republican centrist for governor.
  • They returned a veteran establishment Democrat to Congress.

That is not ideological uniformity. It is a coalition searching for different answers in different races.

What would a socialist revolution actually look like?

The phrase “socialist revolution” makes for an arresting headline, but it sets a much higher standard than several primary victories.

A genuine transformation would require socialist candidates to win repeatedly across regions, demographic groups and levels of government. They would need to change the party’s platform, capture important leadership positions, build durable organizations and translate primary enthusiasm into governing power.

There is evidence that parts of this process are occurring.

Socialist and left-populist candidates are recruiting more effectively. They are improving their fundraising through small-dollar donations. Issues once considered outside the Democratic mainstream—including social housing, stronger sectoral labour rules, medical debt cancellation and aggressive limits on corporate power—are now debated seriously inside the party.

Economic conditions also favour an insurgent message. High housing costs, health-care insecurity, student debt and the concentration of wealth have created an audience for candidates who argue that incremental policy changes are inadequate.

But the Democratic Party remains a large and ideologically diverse coalition. It includes democratic socialists, organized labour, suburban moderates, Black church networks, environmentalists, wealthy professionals, national-security liberals and former Republicans who consider Trump a threat to democratic institutions.

The latest primaries show that the left is gaining leverage inside that coalition. They do not show that it has taken control.

Trump’s endorsement suffered its most visible defeat in Minnesota

The Republican results raise a different question: does Donald Trump still possess the power to determine who wins his party’s primaries?

The most damaging result for Trump came in Minnesota, where state House Speaker Lisa Demuth defeated Mike Lindell for the Republican gubernatorial nomination.

Lindell, the MyPillow founder and one of the country’s most persistent promoters of false claims about the 2020 election, had Trump’s endorsement. He possessed national name recognition and had spent years cultivating a public identity closely tied to the president.

Republican voters nevertheless chose Demuth, an experienced state legislator with stronger connections to Minnesota’s party organization.

The defeat showed a limitation that has occasionally appeared throughout Trump’s political career: his endorsement cannot always rescue a polarizing or poorly positioned candidate. Voters who strongly support Trump may still decide that his preferred nominee is unlikely to win, lacks experience or is unsuited to a particular office.

But it would be a mistake to interpret Lindell’s defeat as a rejection of Trump himself. Demuth did not run as an anti-Trump Republican. Like most successful Republican candidates in 2026, she operated inside a party whose policy agenda, language and political priorities remain heavily shaped by the president.

Trump lost the candidate-selection battle. He did not necessarily lose the ideological one.

Florida demonstrated that Trump’s support still matters

If Minnesota showed the limitations of a Trump endorsement, Florida showed its continuing power.

Trump-backed U.S. Representative Byron Donalds won the Republican nomination for governor, defeating Lieutenant-Governor Jay Collins and businessman James Fishback. Donalds entered the campaign with Trump’s support and a national profile developed through frequent defence of the president.

His victory places him against Jolly in the November election to succeed term-limited Governor Ron DeSantis.

Trump also backed Tom Tiffany, who won the Republican gubernatorial nomination in Wisconsin. In South Carolina, Trump-supported Darline Graham finished first in the Republican special Senate primary, although she failed to win a majority and must face Representative Ralph Norman in an August 25 runoff.

Those outcomes do not resemble a president who has lost his party.

The more complicated case is Florida congressman Cory Mills. Trump endorsed Mills earlier in the campaign but later omitted him from a subsequent endorsement list as Mills faced controversy and a serious primary challenge. Ryan Elijah ultimately defeated Mills for the Republican nomination.

That cannot be counted as a clean defeat for a current Trump endorsement. It is better understood as evidence of strategic retreat: the president’s political operation appeared unwilling to continue investing its reputation in a vulnerable incumbent.

Endorsement statistics can be misleading

The strength of a political endorsement cannot be determined simply by counting wins and losses.

Trump frequently endorses candidates who are already favoured to win. That raises his success rate but makes it difficult to determine whether the endorsement caused the victory. His advisers can also avoid uncertain races, endorse late or quietly allow earlier support to lapse when a candidate becomes vulnerable.

A proper measurement would ask several questions:

  • How was the candidate polling before the endorsement?
  • Did the endorsement change fundraising or media attention?
  • Was the endorsed candidate already the favourite?
  • Did Trump maintain active support through election day?
  • Was the opposing candidate actually challenging Trump’s agenda?
  • Did voters reject Trump, or did they reject an individual candidate’s conduct and electability?

By that more demanding standard, Trump’s endorsement remains highly influential but conditional.

It can consolidate Republican voters around a credible candidate such as Donalds or Tiffany. It is less reliable when attached to a candidate with serious personal liabilities, weak local relationships or doubts about general-election viability.

The broader party remains unmistakably Trump’s. Republican candidates continue to compete over who can most convincingly implement his immigration, trade, cultural and executive-power agenda. Even candidates who defeat his endorsed choices rarely build their campaigns around direct opposition to him.

Trump may be losing some control over personnel. He is not yet losing control over the party’s political vocabulary.

MAGA may be becoming larger than Trump’s personal endorsement

There is another possibility: Trump’s movement may be becoming institutionalized.

During Trump’s first presidential campaign, loyalty to the man and support for his agenda were almost inseparable. A decade later, Republican governors, legislators, activists and media figures have adopted much of his political style and policy framework.

That means a candidate can defeat Trump’s preferred nominee without challenging Trumpism.

This is an important evolution. A political leader’s personal grip may weaken while the movement created around that leader becomes more deeply embedded. Republican voters may feel increasingly comfortable making their own choices among several candidates who all broadly accept the MAGA agenda.

If that is happening, isolated endorsement defeats would not necessarily signal moderation. They could instead indicate that Trump has already succeeded in remaking the party so thoroughly that it no longer depends on his personal intervention in every race.

The real evidence of Trump losing the Republican Party would be different: candidates openly rejecting his central policies, winning primaries by criticizing his presidency, or building a viable alternative ideological coalition.

The August primaries did not produce that evidence.

Two insurgencies, operating differently

The Democratic and Republican results reveal almost opposite relationships between voters and party leadership.

Democratic voters are challenging the party’s institutional establishment while debating what should replace it. Some prefer democratic socialism. Others favour progressive economic populism, generational change or centrist candidates they believe can win difficult elections.

Republican voters remain largely committed to the ideological direction established by Trump, but they are occasionally willing to reject his preferred candidate.

That makes the Democratic conflict more ideological and the Republican conflict more personal.

The left’s gains are real. Flanagan, Nixon and El-Sayed did not win symbolic student elections or safe municipal contests; they captured nominations for the U.S. Senate. Hong came extraordinarily close to winning a statewide nomination in Wisconsin.

Yet Crowley, Klobuchar, Jolly, Bronin and Wasserman Schultz demonstrate that the centre and institutional wing of the Democratic Party remain powerful. The party is not marching uniformly toward socialism. It is holding an unusually public argument over wealth, power, age, urgency and how much compromise the political moment requires.

Trump’s losses are also real. The Lindell result showed that an endorsement from the president does not eliminate concerns about competence or electability. The South Carolina runoff showed that even Trump’s backing cannot always produce an immediate majority.

But Donalds and Tiffany showed that a well-positioned candidate with Trump’s support remains extremely difficult to defeat. More importantly, the candidates beating Trump’s choices are generally not offering Republicans a post-Trump ideology.

The November election will provide the more important test

Primaries measure the preferences of highly engaged party voters. General elections measure whether those choices can persuade a broader public.

For Democrats, the central question is whether progressive nominees can retain traditional party voters while attracting younger people, working-class non-voters and voters frustrated with the economic system. If they can, the party’s leftward movement will accelerate. If they lose winnable races, establishment Democrats will argue that the insurgency elevated ideological purity over governing power.

For Republicans, the question is whether Trump’s continued dominance helps or harms candidates outside the safest conservative states. An endorsement that secures a primary nomination may become a liability if it produces a candidate unable to appeal beyond the MAGA electorate.

The August results provide clues, not final answers.

The Democratic Party is experiencing a serious revolt against caution, incumbency and elite influence. Socialists are an increasingly important part of that revolt, but they do not own it.

Trump’s endorsement is weaker than the mythology surrounding it, particularly when he chooses flawed candidates. Yet his grip on the Republican Party’s ideology remains far stronger than his imperfect primary record might suggest.

The Democratic Party is not undergoing a completed socialist revolution. It is entering a struggle over whether its future will be socialist, progressive, centrist—or some unstable combination of all three.

Trump is not losing the Republican Party. But Republican voters are beginning to show that supporting Trump does not always require obeying him.

Results and race calls were current as of publication on August 18, 2026. Reporting was reviewed against coverage from the [Associated Press’s August 18 election desk](https://apnews.com/article/d2aba8c1c03467119fab2451a62207a2), its [analysis of the August 11 Democratic contests](https://apnews.com/article/0618c650d24c17a2a8f2d3273d813808), and individual reports on the [Wisconsin](https://apnews.com/article/acd872f6cf113e741291b9b47f9d9111) and [Minnesota](https://apnews.com/article/bbadfd4d2a4a1184be74f75ed26b9b72) primaries.